Is Liberalism Dead? Part I

From talk about the failures of liberalism to the rise of “post-liberalism,” a growing chorus of voices has been declaring American liberalism a spent force and a relic of a bygone era. But is this accurate? Are we witnessing the end of a three-century-old political project?

No, not at all. While today's liberalism undoubtedly differs from its seventeenth-century or even mid-twentieth-century iterations, claiming that these differences signal its demise is to misunderstand liberalism's essential adaptability. Political philosopher John Gray reminds us that liberalism is not a monolithic doctrine but a tradition with core themes—including the primacy of the individual, the fundamental moral equality of all, and the belief that human reason can improve our condition—that manifest differently across historical contexts.

In practice, liberalism takes on specific forms depending on the national context and historical moment. French liberalism differs from American liberalism, and American liberalism of the eighteenth century differs from that of the twentieth. These variations are not signs of fragmentation but rather "branches of a common lineage," variations on a set of core themes. As I will argue, the particular form of liberalism we see today is influenced by what can be described as a contemporary form of gnosticism.

How do we account for these variations in liberalism, particularly in the American context? Alexis de Tocqueville, in his seminal work Democracy in America, offered crucial insight: in any given historical period, "real, existing liberalism" is the product of two key forces—the core liberal principles outlined above and the specific social challenges and cultural context of that time.

1849 caricature of Alexis de Tocqueville by Honoré Daumier

Consider the United States' founding era. Core liberal principles informed the creation of a system of negative liberty, limiting state power and protecting individual freedoms. However, the implementation of these principles was also shaped by the ideals of civic republicanism and the anxieties of the time, particularly the fear of tyranny.

Tocqueville recognized that the inherent logic of liberalism, left unchecked, could lead to radical individualism, dissolving social bonds and leaving the sovereign human will unconstrained. However, in America's early years, this tendency was tempered by a strong sense of inherited duty and obligation—what he called the "spirit of Religion," but what might be more accurately called the "spirit of tradition." Founders like James Madison believed that a healthy republic required a citizenry shaped by commitment to institutions like family, church, and local communities. These institutions fostered a "communal spirit," respecting tradition and inherited norms that complemented and counterbalanced the "spirit of liberty." This unique fusion, Tocqueville argued, created a distinctively American liberalism that balanced individual freedom with a commitment to social order.

Fast forward to the twentieth century, and we see a similar dynamic at play in the rise of social liberalism, championed by figures like John Dewey. Here, core liberal principles were used to address new challenges: rapid industrialization, urbanization, and inequality. This new liberalism embraced positive liberty and an interventionist state, shifting from the limited government ideals of classical liberalism. 

However, even in this new form, liberalism remained tethered to traditionalist moorings. The belief in natural rights, the importance of family, and limitations on state power acted as guardrails, shaping the scope of social reform. Thus, the social liberalism of the early twentieth century, while distinct from its earlier iterations, also provided a framework for institutions like family, civic associations, and religious institutions to thrive.

The late 1960s marked a dramatic shift in the American context. A new form of liberalism emerged, shaped by concerns around race, gender, and sexuality. Unlike previous eras, this new iteration did not arise against the backdrop of a robust spirit of tradition. Instead, it flourished in a post-tradition America, where respect for inherited institutions and norms had significantly eroded.

In my article, "Liberalism Occupied: The Rise of the Gnostic Liberal State After Christianity," I call this new form of liberalism “gnostic liberalism,” and I argue that contemporary liberalism has adopted a distinctly gnostic orientation, which can be traced to its abandonment of a traditional Christian and moral worldview.

William Blake, plate from The Song of Los, 1795

Historically, gnosticism was a religious and philosophical movement that emerged in the early centuries of the Common Era, encompassing various schools like Manichaeism and Hermeticism. At its core, gnosticism offered a radically dualistic worldview: the material world was seen as a flawed, even corrupt, creation from which humanity must escape to attain spiritual enlightenment. Liberation could only be achieved through esoteric knowledge, or “gnosis,” which revealed the true, transcendent nature of human beings and their potential to ascend beyond the confines of ordinary existence. This pursuit of higher knowledge, which could only be attained by an elite few, placed the individual in opposition to established structures and viewed societal and natural limits as obstacles to self-realization.

Although ancient gnosticism waned as a religious movement, its core impulse—transcending material and natural constraints to realize a self-determined identity—finds echoes in modern ideologies that reject inherited norms and limits. Today's "gnostic liberalism" shares this impulse, redefining liberty not simply as the exercise of individual freedom within a shared moral order but as the unrestricted power to remake the self and society according to personal will. In this context, contemporary liberalism has become a historically specific form of gnosticism, shaped by the belief that humanity's primary obstacle is not a lack of political or social freedom but the restrictions imposed by nature, tradition, and social structure.

Modern liberalism, under the influence of gnostic principles, therefore marks a shift from classical liberalism, which accepted human nature and moral constraints as givens. In this gnostic form, liberalism no longer seeks merely to expand individual freedom within a stable framework of shared moral norms. Instead, it empowers individuals to "liberate" themselves from all external constraints, viewing any inherited or natural boundaries as oppressive. Part II of this essay is available here.

Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a Non-Resident Fellow with Defense Priorities—both think tanks in Washington, DC.

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Is Liberalism Dead? Part II

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