Critical Theory and Ancient Political Philosophy: Part III
Horkheimer’s Discontinuity with the Ancients
In parts one and two of this series, I outlined Max Horkheimer’s argument for why critical theory is essentially consonant with ancient philosophy. In this final part, we now turn to consider how seriously Horkheimer’s claim can be taken. As we have seen, Horkheimer makes a strong genealogical claim about the social function of philosophy that traces his own project back to Socrates. In the process, Horkheimer ultimately identifies a need to move beyond the ancients. If we attend to the nature of this criticism, however, it becomes evident that Horkheimer’s view of the ancients as a whole is informed less by careful study, and more by an application of his own philosophical framework to their ideas. This can be seen most clearly in three ways. First, Horkheimer overstates the importance of philosophy’s critical function. This leads him to claim that Socrates held to a concept of historical progress by which reason gradually—though not inevitably—ushers us toward general social and political improvement. Second, Horkheimer overestimates the concern the ancients had for material conditions, and in doing so implies that they share his economic egalitarianism. Finally, Horkheimer’s claim in “The Social Function of Philosophy” to be concerned with a transhistorical philosophic truth clashes with assertions that he makes elsewhere, leading to a fundamental contradiction in Horkheimer’s own thought. All of this serves to demonstrate that Horkheimer’s genealogical claims about critical theory are, at bottom, false: critical theory is not the heir to classical political philosophy. Rather, it is the continuation of the historically contingent progressive political philosophy which emerged in the Enlightenment.
It is of course impossible to read Plato’s Apology without concluding that philosophy, especially as practiced by Socrates, concerns itself with criticizing the established political order. Socrates’ comparison of himself to a gadfly stinging the metaphorical horse that is Athens makes clear that philosophy can and should serve to challenge the political status quo. But the critical function of philosophy is not so uncompromising as Horkheimer suggests. While Socrates is directly (and quite severely) critical of the established political order in the Apology, his argument in the Crito indicates a deep respect for the laws of the city, as well as a rather straightforward acknowledgement of their necessity and goodness, even when they produce injustice. Indeed, Socrates contends that to break the laws of the city would be an injustice under almost any circumstance, going as far as to argue that the laws should stand even when their effect is unjust.
The critical function of philosophy is still maintained, even in the Crito, but it is tempered by prudence that defers in large part to the existing order, even while criticizing it. As Leo Strauss argues in an essay on the Apology, “Socrates did not think that there was an unqualified duty to obey the laws. But this did not prevent him from thinking... that the demand for such obedience is a wise rule of thumb.” In other words, Socrates was careful to temper the critical aspect of his philosophy with an example that suggests the importance of stability within the regime. The goal of Socrates’ political philosophy was emphatically not to incite revolution and effect immediate change. For Horkheimer, on the other hand, it is precisely the goal of philosophy to point man towards the future, and in doing so facilitate immediate and straightforward change in the existing order.
Horkheimer’s claim that philosophy’s critical function is meant to point man toward the future is also problematized upon a deeper reading of the Apology. At first glance, it may seem that insofar as criticism implies the inadequacy of the existing order, it must necessarily imply the need for a new order. A more serious consideration of Socrates arguments suggests, however, that criticism may actually demand a return to something that existed previously. Indeed, in the very same sentence where Socrates calls himself a gadfly, he also describes Athens as a “great and well-born horse.” His function as a gadfly is not to change Athens from a horse into donkey, but rather to fulfill the potential of its nature as a horse. The fundamental nature of the city is not in question, but rather developments in the city that have turned it away from its natural ends. Socrates’ role as gadfly, then, is properly understood not as a harbinger of radical change, but rather as the impetus to return to a more natural and stable state of affairs.
Just as Horkheimer overstates the centrality of philosophy’s critical function for Socrates, he also overstates the significance for the ancients of “equitable” conditions as a pre-requisite for philosophic thought. The communism of property proposed in the Republic is applicable only to the Guardian class within the city. Socrates’ arguments in this respect cannot be understood to constitute an imperative to create broadly equitable conditions within society at large. And, while Aristotle does indeed remark on the importance of “equipment” for the sake of virtue, and in doing so evinces a certain degree of concern for man’s material well-being, he in no way commits himself to a schema of equitable property distribution, or anything that remotely resembles a truly egalitarian society. In other words, while Socrates and Aristotle do seem to recognize the impact that material conditions will have on man’s ability to live well (and consequently his ability to philosophize), there is nothing in ancient thought that demands the kind of social and economic egalitarianism that Horkheimer believes to be necessary.
But the most serious problem for Horkheimer’s attempt to associate himself with the ancients is his assertion that he, like the ancients, directs philosophy primarily toward the discovery of transhistorical truths that are capable of ordering society. In “The Social Function of Philosophy,” Horkheimer repeatedly invokes the concept of “reason” without elaborating on the nature of that concept. In later works such as “The End of Reason,” however, Horkheimer suggests that reason is merely a systematization of the human desire for self-preservation, and as such produces and perpetuates the very industrial society that he seeks to criticize. He clarifies in his book The Eclipse of Reason that this kind of reason ought to be understood as “subjective reason,” that it coexists with an “objective reason” that attempts to avoid subordination to the historical situation. Horkheimer warns that objective reason is in constant danger of “lagging behind industrial and scientific developments,” and consequently “asserting meaning that proves to be an illusion.” Ultimately, Horkheimer contends that the task of philosophy is to “foster a mutual critique” between the two types of reason so as to “prepare in the intellectual realm the reconciliation of the two in reality.”
While this description of the role of philosophy is not significantly different than that presented in “The Social Function of Philosophy,” the further explication of the concept of reason presents serious problems. In “The Social Function of Philosophy,” it seemed possible that, so long as philosophy pointed toward a transhistorical human truth, that truth would provide a clear blueprint for how society should be ordered. But, the subordination of reason to the historical process suggests that the philosopher will always lack access to transhistorical truth. Philosophy instead merely makes us capable of “facing the inferno” to which “triumphant [instrumental] reason has reduced the world,” and recognizing it for what it is.
The two counterposing ideas of reason Horkheimer proposes lead the philosopher not towards a transcendent truth, but rather a set of historically contingent and ultimately changeable set of conclusions. Thus, Horkheimer actually contends that the conclusions of the philosopher will necessarily be different at different points in history. This is to say, that while the basic ends of abstract or objective reasoning may be the same throughout periods of history, the means by which they are brought into reality will necessarily modify them in the particular. Philosophy thus does not point toward an abstract transhistorical truth for humanity, but rather to a murky, historically contingent truth that seeks to accommodate the broadest conclusions of abstract reasoning to historical and material conditions.
By ultimately rejecting the transcendent, Horkheimer significantly complicates his assertion of continuity with the ancients. One of the paramount functions of classical political philosophy was the conception of the “best regime.” The recurrence of this theme in the works of Aristotle and Plato demands our attention. Careful reading of Plato and Aristotle suggests that what they are really concerned with is the creation of the best possible regime. They recognize that the “best regime” in thought may not actually be the same thing as the “best possible regime.” What is important to make clear, however, is that the ancients understood possibility as being bound by human nature, not man’s historical condition. Thus, the best possible regime was fundamentally transhistorical, as human nature was understood to be unchangeable. Horkheimer’s understanding of reason and its relationship to political institutions can be seen as wholly different from the position taken by the ancients. The significance that history plays for Horkheimer suggests the possibility of changes in human nature, and thus an ever-changing idea of the best possible regime.
At its roots, then, Horkheimer’s critical theory is fundamentally discontinuous with the ancient tradition. Indeed, it is clear that the distinctly modern and fundamentally progressive concept of historical progress undergirds and informs his entire project. Rejecting ancient understandings of the fundamental unchangeability of human nature, Horkheimer adopts a concept of historical progress found in early enlightenment thought and reified in the writings of Karl Marx. Consequently, “The Social Function of Philosophy” reveals Horkheimer to be the heir of innovative modern philosophy. While this does delegitimize Horkheimer’s claims of affinity between his own critical theory and the critical nature of ancient philosophy, it does help clarify the grounds of critical theory in such a way that it is difficult to assail from within the modern tradition. Thus, while proponents of critical theory are made more certain of their method’s genealogy, critics of the method are provided with a clearer ground for their own critique. At bottom, the most robust arguments against critical theory require a simultaneous critique of modern progressive and historically contingent philosophy.
Joseph Karol Natali is a third year PhD. student in the political science program at Baylor University. His research focuses on American Institutions with a secondary focus on the impact of 19th and 20th century German existentialism on contemporary political theory.