Critical Theory and Ancient Political Philosophy: Part II
A marble head of Socrates in the Louvre (copy of bronze head by Lysippus)
Max Horkheimer on the Critical Role of Socrates
In the first part of this series, I provided an introduction to the philosophical method of critical theory, and introduced Max Horkheimer’s basic argument in “The Social Function of Philosophy.” In this second part, I will outline Horkheimer’s attempt to align his critical project with the basic tasks of classical political philosophy. It is no accident that in introducing the critical function of philosophy, Max Horkheimer makes explicit reference to the trial of Socrates. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates gives an account of himself and his actions that is apparently consonant with Horkheimer’s presentation of philosophy. For example, Socrates’ contention that “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being” suggests the need for a constant and critical appraisal of our actions. This is true for the city as well as the individual. According to Socrates, Athens is in perpetual need of a critical agitator, without whom the city remains “asleep” and unmoving. Unless a “gadfly” such as Socrates appears, Athens is doomed to eternal slumber, stagnating in a blind affirmation of an existing social order that has ceased to be salubrious for humankind—if indeed it ever was.
Horkheimer’s reference to Socrates is meant to make clear that philosophy has always served a critical function, and has always intended to improve the political community through this criticism. While industrial society presents a somewhat novel problem for Horkheimer, he contends that all prevailing social orders are intent on self-perpetuation—and thus, in the absence of the gadfly of philosophy, ultimately intent on stagnation. In short, Horkheimer seeks to establish through Socrates a basis for the progressive political role of his own critical theory, and in doing so, validate the inherently progressive trend of modern philosophic thought.
But Horkheimer’s engagement with Socrates goes deeper than simply identifying a critical and progressive function in the earliest forms of philosophy. As Socrates makes clear in the Apology, his criticism is not simple iconoclasm, but rather a means of effecting positive change among the citizens of Athens. Socrates claims that his philosophical criticism intends, indirectly, to teach men to be virtuous. Horkheimer envisions a similar, positive social role for critical philosophy, arguing that human thought possesses a “practical tendency of pointing toward the future,” and thus by its very nature will serve to advance the estate of man. Criticism, for Horkheimer, insofar as it is primarily a refusal to merely accept the prevailing ideas in a given society, is not necessarily destructive. Rather, it is precisely through this negative resistance to the prevailing social order that new, positive improvements emerge.
Like Socrates, Horkheimer appears to be concerned with a certain kind of objective truth, especially as it relates to the question of what makes the organization of a political community “good.” Horkheimer criticizes the reduction of philosophy to “ideology” by pointing out that doing so inevitably leads to a rejection of truth as such. Philosophy understood only as ideology demands the acceptance of all truths as situationally determined, foreclosing on the possibility of a higher “philosophical truth” that can inform the organization of society. Here Horkheimer seems to be making the case for the existence of a truth that is, if not transhistorical, at the very least trans-situational. He contends that, in order for a society to be rationally organized, there must be some transcendent truth that informs society’s rational organization.
Finally, Horkheimer identifies in Socrates—and, implicitly, in all of ancient philosophy—a recognition of the important role played by material conditions in the philosophic endeavor. For Horkheimer, the aims of ancient philosophy were geared toward the “development of critical and dialectical thought” in order to bring reality—as manifest in human social and political systems—into conformity with reason. At the same time, Horkheimer contends that the ancients “did not believe... that reason could forever continue to develop in people who literally led a dog’s life, nor that wisdom could go hand in hand with misery.” Consequently, Horkheimer makes the rather curious assertion that the ancients recognized that there must also be “an equitable state of affairs.” This claim is curious because Horkheimer does not ground it by referencing any particular work of ancient philosophy (though support could perhaps be found for it by examining the argument for communism in Book III of Plato’s Republic, as well as some comments made in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics). The dubious nature of these particular claims aside, Horkheimer sees them as important for establishing a genealogical link between ancient political philosophy and his own system of critical theory.
Because Plato and Aristotle apparently evince a serious concern with the actual material conditions of society, Horkheimer argues that the natural next step of philosophy is to turn away from the construction of abstract “Utopias,” a practice Horkheimer sees as characteristic of ancient thought. For Horkheimer, there exist “contradictions in thought” that cannot be resolved by purely abstract reflection. Philosophy must turn away from abstraction, and instead engage in “scientific description of concrete relationships and tendencies which can lead to an improvement of human life.” In other words, philosophy must engage in practical thought, determining, perhaps by cooperation with the “hard” sciences, precisely how a truly rational society can be created. By indicating a concern with material conditions alongside a desire to rationally order society, Horkheimer contends that the ancients sowed the seeds that would eventually grow into his new critical theory. Horkheimer and his critical theory are thus presented as the logical next step in the tradition of Western political philosophy, recognizing the ancients’ largely underdeveloped observations about the importance of material conditions (lacking, perhaps, the drive towards more equitable distribution of wealth) as a call to merge theory and practice. Horkheimer does not intend to denigrate the importance of the ancients or correct them. Indeed, he suggests that the move to his critical theory is in large part the result of particular historical conditions that were simply not present at the time Plato and Aristotle were writing.
All of this is consonant with Horkheimer’s presentation of “the aim of Western Philosophy,” which he contends “was to cancel and negate one-sidedness in a more comprehensive system of thought... more flexible and better adapted to reality.” Horkheimer argues that philosophy aims towards a knowledge of the whole, to “bring and maintain the various energies and branches of knowledge in a unity.” The rule of the philosopher king as it is presented in Book VI of the Republic is the culmination of this goal. Only the philosopher, who possesses knowledge of the whole, is capable of rationally organizing human existence within society. It is precisely this rational organization that Horkheimer understands the great philosophers to be seeking: the philosopher is the reconciliation of reason with reality as it manifests in the political community. Horkheimer thus makes an argument strikingly similar to that of Socrates in the Republic. There, Socrates argues that philosophers, who have turned their understanding “toward the things that are”—towards being itself, and thus knowledge of the whole—would be the ideal rulers of the most just city.
Max Horkheimer
Horkheimer makes a compelling case that he, and his method of critical theory, are the truest continuation of the initial philosophic project of the Western tradition. While Horkheimer’s engagement with the ancients is not a central part of his work before or after the publication of “The Social Function of Philosophy,” this often-neglected text nevertheless centers his overall project. By claiming continuity with the ancients, Horkheimer attempts to distinguish his critical theory from all other kinds of contemporary philosophic thought—not by suggesting that critical theory is a new innovation upon the philosophic tradition, but rather that it is actually philosophy in its purest form. Yet, as I will argue in the third part of this series, it is precisely this claim that makes Horkheimer’s attempt to establish continuity between himself and the ancients questionable.
Joseph Karol Natali is a third year PhD. student in the political science program at Baylor University. His research focuses on American Institutions with a secondary focus on the impact of 19th and 20th century German existentialism on contemporary political theory.